grpc-swift/Sources/BoringSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 *
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 *
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */

#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>

#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>

#include "vpm_int.h"
#include "../internal.h"

static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;

/* CRL score values */

/* No unhandled critical extensions */

#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100

/* certificate is within CRL scope */

#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080

/* CRL times valid */

#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040

/* Issuer name matches certificate */

#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020

/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */

#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)

/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */

#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018

/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */

#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008

/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */

#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004

/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */

#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002

static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
                           int *pcrl_score);
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
                           unsigned int *preasons);
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);

static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
    return ok;
}

#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
    return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
}
#endif
/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
{
    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
        return 1;
    else
        return 0;
}

/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */

static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
    size_t i;
    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
    if (certs == NULL)
        return NULL;
    /* Look for exact match */
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
            break;
    }
    if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
    else
        xtmp = NULL;
    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
    return xtmp;
}

int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
    int bad_chain = 0;
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
    int depth, i, ok = 0;
    int num, j, retry;
    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
        return -1;
    }
    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
        /*
         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
         * cannot do another one.
         */
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
        return -1;
    }

    cb = ctx->verify_cb;

    /*
     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
     * the first entry is in place
     */
    ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
    if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto end;
    }
    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;

    /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
        && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto end;
    }

    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
    depth = param->depth;

    for (;;) {
        /* If we have enough, we break */
        if (depth < num)
            break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
                                 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
                                 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
                                 * later. */

        /* If we are self signed, we break */
        if (cert_self_signed(x))
            break;
        /*
         * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
         */
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
            if (ok < 0)
                goto end;
            /*
             * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
             * again later.
             */
            if (ok > 0) {
                X509_free(xtmp);
                break;
            }
        }

        /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
        if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
            xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
            if (xtmp != NULL) {
                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
                    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                    goto end;
                }
                X509_up_ref(xtmp);
                (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
                ctx->last_untrusted++;
                x = xtmp;
                num++;
                /*
                 * reparse the full chain for the next one
                 */
                continue;
            }
        }
        break;
    }

    /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
    j = num;
    /*
     * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
     * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
     * complain.
     */

    do {
        /*
         * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
         */
        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
        if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
            /* we have a self signed certificate */
            if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
                /*
                 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
                 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
                 * possible impersonation.
                 */
                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
                if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
                    ctx->current_cert = x;
                    ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
                    if (ok == 1)
                        X509_free(xtmp);
                    bad_chain = 1;
                    ok = cb(0, ctx);
                    if (!ok)
                        goto end;
                } else {
                    /*
                     * We have a match: replace certificate with store
                     * version so we get any trust settings.
                     */
                    X509_free(x);
                    x = xtmp;
                    (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
                    ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
                }
            } else {
                /*
                 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
                 */
                chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                ctx->last_untrusted--;
                num--;
                j--;
                x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
            }
        }
        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
        for (;;) {
            /* If we have enough, we break */
            if (depth < num)
                break;
            /* If we are self signed, we break */
            if (cert_self_signed(x))
                break;
            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);

            if (ok < 0)
                goto end;
            if (ok == 0)
                break;
            x = xtmp;
            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
                X509_free(xtmp);
                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                ok = 0;
                goto end;
            }
            num++;
        }

        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
        i = check_trust(ctx);

        /* If explicitly rejected error */
        if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
            goto end;
        /*
         * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
         * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
         * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
         * chain checking
         */
        retry = 0;
        if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
            while (j-- > 1) {
                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
                if (ok < 0)
                    goto end;
                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
                if (ok > 0) {
                    /*
                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
                     */
                    X509_free(xtmp);

                    /*
                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
                     * alternate chain
                     */
                    while (num > j) {
                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                        X509_free(xtmp);
                        num--;
                    }
                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
                    retry = 1;
                    break;
                }
            }
        }
    } while (retry);

    /*
     * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
     * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
     * and set bad_chain == 1
     */
    if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
        if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
            if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
            else
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
        } else {

            sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
            num++;
            ctx->last_untrusted = num;
            ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
            chain_ss = NULL;
        }

        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
        bad_chain = 1;
        ok = cb(0, ctx);
        if (!ok)
            goto end;
    }

    /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
    ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);

    if (!ok)
        goto end;

    /* Check name constraints */

    ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);

    if (!ok)
        goto end;

    ok = check_id(ctx);

    if (!ok)
        goto end;

    /*
     * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
     * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
     */

    ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
    if (!ok)
        goto end;

    i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
                                ctx->param->flags);
    if (i != X509_V_OK) {
        ctx->error = i;
        ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
        ok = cb(0, ctx);
        if (!ok)
            goto end;
    }

    /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
        ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
    else
        ok = internal_verify(ctx);
    if (!ok)
        goto end;

    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
    if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);

 end:
    if (sktmp != NULL)
        sk_X509_free(sktmp);
    if (chain_ss != NULL)
        X509_free(chain_ss);
    return ok;
}

/*
 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 */

static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
    size_t i;
    X509 *issuer;
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
            return issuer;
    }
    return NULL;
}

/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */

static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
    int ret;
    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
    if (ret == X509_V_OK)
        return 1;
    /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
        return 0;

    ctx->error = ret;
    ctx->current_cert = x;
    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}

/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */

static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
    if (*issuer) {
        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
        return 1;
    } else
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
 * purpose
 */

static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
    X509 *x;
    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    int proxy_path_length = 0;
    int purpose;
    int allow_proxy_certs;
    cb = ctx->verify_cb;

    /*
     * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA
     * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which
     * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is
     * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future
     * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used
     * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
     */
    must_be_ca = -1;

    /* CRL path validation */
    if (ctx->parent) {
        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
    } else {
        allow_proxy_certs =
            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
        /*
         * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
         * happy
         */
        if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
            allow_proxy_certs = 1;
        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
    }

    /* Check all untrusted certificates */
    for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
        int ret;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto end;
        }
        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto end;
        }
        ret = X509_check_ca(x);
        switch (must_be_ca) {
        case -1:
            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
                ret = 0;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
            } else
                ret = 1;
            break;
        case 0:
            if (ret != 0) {
                ret = 0;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
            } else
                ret = 1;
            break;
        default:
            if ((ret == 0)
                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                    && (ret != 1))) {
                ret = 0;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
            } else
                ret = 1;
            break;
        }
        if (ret == 0) {
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto end;
        }
        if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
            ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
            if ((ret == 0)
                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                    && (ret != 1))) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
                ctx->error_depth = i;
                ctx->current_cert = x;
                ok = cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto end;
            }
        }
        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto end;
        }
        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
            plen++;
        /*
         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
         */
        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                ctx->error_depth = i;
                ctx->current_cert = x;
                ok = cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto end;
            }
            proxy_path_length++;
            must_be_ca = 0;
        } else
            must_be_ca = 1;
    }
    ok = 1;
 end:
    return ok;
}

static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    X509 *x;
    int i, j, rv;
    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
            continue;
        /*
         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
         * to be obeyed.
         */
        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
            if (nc) {
                rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
                if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
                    ctx->error = rv;
                    ctx->error_depth = i;
                    ctx->current_cert = x;
                    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    return 1;
}

static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
{
    ctx->error = errcode;
    ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
    ctx->error_depth = 0;
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}

static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
{
    size_t i;
    size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
    char *name;

    if (id->peername != NULL) {
        OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
        id->peername = NULL;
    }
    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
        if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
                            &id->peername) > 0)
            return 1;
    }
    return n == 0;
}

static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
    if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
            return 0;
    }
    if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
            return 0;
    }
    if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
            return 0;
    }
    return 1;
}

static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    size_t i;
    int ok;
    X509 *x = NULL;
    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
    /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
    for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
        ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
        if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
        /*
         * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
         * overridden.
         */
        if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
        }
    }
    /*
     * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
     * return success.
     */
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
        X509 *mx;
        if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
        if (mx) {
            (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
            X509_free(x);
            ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
        }
    }

    /*
     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
     */
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}

static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    int i, last, ok;
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
        return 1;
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
    else {
        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
        if (ctx->parent)
            return 1;
        last = 0;
    }
    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
        ctx->error_depth = i;
        ok = check_cert(ctx);
        if (!ok)
            return ok;
    }
    return 1;
}

static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_POTENTIALLY_UNINITIALIZED_WARNINGS
{
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
    X509 *x;
    int ok, cnum;
    unsigned int last_reasons;
    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
    ctx->current_cert = x;
    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
        last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
        if (ctx->get_crl)
            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
        else
            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
        /*
         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
         */
        if (!ok) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            goto err;
        }
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
        if (!ok)
            goto err;

        if (dcrl) {
            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
        } else
            ok = 1;

        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
        if (ok != 2) {
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
        }

        X509_CRL_free(crl);
        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
        crl = NULL;
        dcrl = NULL;
        /*
         * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
         * so exit loop.
         */
        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            goto err;
        }
    }
 err:
    X509_CRL_free(crl);
    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);

    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
    return ok;

}

/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */

static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
    time_t *ptime;
    int i;
    if (notify)
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
    else
        ptime = NULL;

    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
    if (i == 0) {
        if (!notify)
            return 0;
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    if (i > 0) {
        if (!notify)
            return 0;
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);

        if (i == 0) {
            if (!notify)
                return 0;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                return 0;
        }
        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
            if (!notify)
                return 0;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                return 0;
        }
    }

    if (notify)
        ctx->current_crl = NULL;

    return 1;
}

static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
    int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
    size_t i;
    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;

    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
        reasons = *preasons;
        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);

        if (crl_score > best_score) {
            best_crl = crl;
            best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
            best_score = crl_score;
            best_reasons = reasons;
        }
    }

    if (best_crl) {
        if (*pcrl)
            X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
        *pcrl = best_crl;
        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
        *pscore = best_score;
        *preasons = best_reasons;
        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
        if (*pdcrl) {
            X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
            *pdcrl = NULL;
        }
        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
    }

    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
        return 1;

    return 0;
}

/*
 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
 */

static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
    int i;
    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
    if (i >= 0) {
        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
            return 0;
        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
    } else
        exta = NULL;

    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);

    if (i >= 0) {

        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
            return 0;
        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
    } else
        extb = NULL;

    if (!exta && !extb)
        return 1;

    if (!exta || !extb)
        return 0;

    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
        return 0;

    return 1;
}

/* See if a base and delta are compatible */

static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
        return 0;
    /* Base must have a CRL number */
    if (!base->crl_number)
        return 0;
    /* Issuer names must match */
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
        return 0;
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
        return 0;
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
        return 0;
    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
        return 0;
    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
        return 1;
    return 0;
}

/*
 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
 */

static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
    X509_CRL *delta;
    size_t i;
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
        return;
    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
        return;
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
            *dcrl = delta;
            return;
        }
    }
    *dcrl = NULL;
}

/*
 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
 */

static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{

    int crl_score = 0;
    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;

    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */

    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
        return 0;
    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
            return 0;
    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
        /* If no new reasons reject */
        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
            return 0;
    }
    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
        return 0;
    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
            return 0;
    } else
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;

    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;

    /* Check expiry */
    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;

    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);

    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */

    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
        return 0;

    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */

    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
        /* If no new reasons reject */
        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
            return 0;
        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
    }

    *preasons = tmp_reasons;

    return crl_score;

}

static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
{
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
    size_t i;

    if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
        cidx++;

    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);

    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
            return;
        }
    }

    for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
            continue;
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
            return;
        }
    }

    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */

    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
        return;

    /*
     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
     * untrusted certificates.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
            continue;
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
            return;
        }
    }
}

/*
 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
 */

static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
    int ret;
    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
    if (ctx->parent)
        return 0;
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
        return -1;

    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
    /* Copy verify params across */
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);

    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;

    /* Verify CRL issuer */
    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);

    if (ret <= 0)
        goto err;

    /* Check chain is acceptable */

    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
 err:
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
    return ret;
}

/*
 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
 * RFC5280 version
 */

static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
{
    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
        return 1;
    return 0;
}

/*
 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
 */

static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
{
    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
    size_t i, j;
    if (!a || !b)
        return 1;
    if (a->type == 1) {
        if (!a->dpname)
            return 0;
        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
        if (b->type == 1) {
            if (!b->dpname)
                return 0;
            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
                return 1;
            else
                return 0;
        }
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
        nm = a->dpname;
        gens = b->name.fullname;
    } else if (b->type == 1) {
        if (!b->dpname)
            return 0;
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
        gens = a->name.fullname;
        nm = b->dpname;
    }

    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
    if (nm) {
        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
                continue;
            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
                return 1;
        }
        return 0;
    }

    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */

    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
                return 1;
        }
    }

    return 0;

}

static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
{
    size_t i;
    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
            continue;
        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
            return 1;
    }
    return 0;
}

/* Check CRLDP and IDP */

static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
                           unsigned int *preasons)
{
    size_t i;
    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
        return 0;
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
            return 0;
    } else {
        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
            return 0;
    }
    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
                return 1;
            }
        }
    }
    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
        return 1;
    return 0;
}

/*
 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
 * to find a delta CRL too
 */

static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
    int ok;
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
    int crl_score = 0;
    unsigned int reasons;
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);

    if (ok)
        goto done;

    /* Lookup CRLs from store */

    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);

    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
    if (!skcrl && crl)
        goto done;

    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);

    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);

 done:

    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
    if (crl) {
        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
        *pcrl = crl;
        *pdcrl = dcrl;
        return 1;
    }

    return 0;
}

/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
    int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
    chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
    if (ctx->current_issuer)
        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;

    /*
     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
     * certificate in chain.
     */
    else if (cnum < chnum)
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
    else {
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
        }
    }

    if (issuer) {
        /*
         * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
         */
        if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
                !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto err;
            }

            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto err;
            }

            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
                if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
                    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                    if (!ok)
                        goto err;
                }
            }

            if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto err;
            }

        }

        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
            ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
        }

        /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
        ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);

        if (!ikey) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok)
                goto err;
        } else {
            int rv;
            rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
            if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
                ctx->error = rv;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto err;
            }
            /* Verify CRL signature */
            if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto err;
            }
        }
    }

    ok = 1;

 err:
    EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
    return ok;
}

/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
    int ok;
    X509_REVOKED *rev;
    /*
     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
     */
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
        if (!ok)
            return 0;
    }
    /*
     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
     * is not removeFromCRL.
     */
    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
            return 2;
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
        if (!ok)
            return 0;
    }

    return 1;
}

static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    int ret;
    if (ctx->parent)
        return 1;
    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
    if (ret == 0) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        return 0;
    }
    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
    if (ret == -1) {
        /*
         * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
         */
        X509 *x;
        size_t i;
        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
                continue;
            ctx->current_cert = x;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                return 0;
        }
        return 1;
    }
    if (ret == -2) {
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
    }

    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
        ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    return 1;
}

static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
    time_t *ptime;
    int i;

    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
    else
        ptime = NULL;

    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
    if (i == 0) {
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    if (i > 0) {
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
    if (i == 0) {
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    if (i < 0) {
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
            return 0;
    }

    return 1;
}

static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    int ok = 0, n;
    X509 *xs, *xi;
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

    cb = ctx->verify_cb;

    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
    ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
    n--;
    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);

    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
        xs = xi;
    else {
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
            xs = xi;
            goto check_cert;
        }
        if (n <= 0) {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
            ctx->current_cert = xi;
            ok = cb(0, ctx);
            goto end;
        } else {
            n--;
            ctx->error_depth = n;
            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
        }
    }

/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
    while (n >= 0) {
        ctx->error_depth = n;

        /*
         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
         * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
         * time.
         */
        if (!xs->valid
            && (xs != xi
                || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
            if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                ctx->current_cert = xi;
                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
                if (!ok)
                    goto end;
            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                ctx->current_cert = xs;
                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
                if (!ok) {
                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                    goto end;
                }
            }
            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
            pkey = NULL;
        }

        xs->valid = 1;

 check_cert:
        ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
        if (!ok)
            goto end;

        /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
        ctx->current_cert = xs;
        ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
        if (!ok)
            goto end;

        n--;
        if (n >= 0) {
            xi = xs;
            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
        }
    }
    ok = 1;
 end:
    return ok;
}

int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}

int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
    char *str;
    ASN1_TIME atm;
    long offset;
    char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
    int i, j, remaining;

    p = buff1;
    remaining = ctm->length;
    str = (char *)ctm->data;
    /*
     * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in
     * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
     */
    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
        /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
        int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
        int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
            return 0;
        memcpy(p, str, 10);
        p += 10;
        str += 10;
        remaining -= 10;
    } else {
        /*
         * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm
         */
        int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
        int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
        if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
            return 0;
        memcpy(p, str, 12);
        p += 12;
        str += 12;
        remaining -= 12;
    }

    if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
        *(p++) = '0';
        *(p++) = '0';
    } else {
        /* SS (seconds) */
        if (remaining < 2)
            return 0;
        *(p++) = *(str++);
        *(p++) = *(str++);
        remaining -= 2;
        /*
         * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in
         * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them
         * altogether?
         */
        if (remaining && *str == '.') {
            str++;
            remaining--;
            for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
                if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
                    break;
            }
        }

    }
    *(p++) = 'Z';
    *(p++) = '\0';

    /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
    if (!remaining)
        return 0;
    if (*str == 'Z') {
        if (remaining != 1)
            return 0;
        offset = 0;
    } else {
        /* (+-)HHMM */
        if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
            return 0;
        /*
         * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280.
         */
        if (remaining != 5)
            return 0;
        if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
            str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
            return 0;
        offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
        offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
        if (*str == '-')
            offset = -offset;
    }
    atm.type = ctm->type;
    atm.flags = 0;
    atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
    atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;

    if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
        return 0;

    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
        i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
        if (i < 50)
            i += 100;           /* cf. RFC 2459 */
        j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
        if (j < 50)
            j += 100;

        if (i < j)
            return -1;
        if (i > j)
            return 1;
    }
    i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
    if (i == 0)                 /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
        return -1;
    else
        return i;
}

ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
    return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}

ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
}

ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
    time_t t = 0;

    if (in_tm)
        t = *in_tm;
    else
        time(&t);

    if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
            return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
            return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
    }
    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}

/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */

X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
{
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
    int i;
    size_t j;
    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* Issuer names must match */
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
        return NULL;
    }
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* CRLs must verify */
    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
        return NULL;
    }
    /* Create new CRL */
    crl = X509_CRL_new();
    if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
        goto memerr;
    /* Set issuer name */
    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
        goto memerr;

    if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
        goto memerr;
    if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
        goto memerr;

    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */

    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
        goto memerr;

    /*
     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
     * number to correct value too.
     */

    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
            goto memerr;
    }

    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */

    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);

    for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
        /*
         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
         */
        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
            if (!rvtmp)
                goto memerr;
            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
                goto memerr;
            }
        }
    }
    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */

    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
        goto memerr;

    return crl;

 memerr:
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    if (crl)
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
    return NULL;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
    /*
     * This function is (usually) called only once, by
     * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
     */
    int index;
    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
                                 dup_func, free_func)) {
        return -1;
    }
    return index;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
}

void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->error;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
    ctx->error = err;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->error_depth;
}

X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->current_cert;
}

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->chain;
}

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    if (!ctx->chain)
        return NULL;
    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}

X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->current_issuer;
}

X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->current_crl;
}

X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->parent;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
    ctx->cert = x;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
    ctx->untrusted = sk;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
{
    ctx->crls = sk;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
{
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
}

/*
 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
 * client/server.
 */

int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
                                   int purpose, int trust)
{
    int idx;
    /* If purpose not set use default */
    if (!purpose)
        purpose = def_purpose;
    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
    if (purpose) {
        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
        if (idx == -1) {
            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
            return 0;
        }
        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
            if (idx == -1) {
                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                return 0;
            }
            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
        }
        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
        if (!trust)
            trust = ptmp->trust;
    }
    if (trust) {
        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
        if (idx == -1) {
            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
            return 0;
        }
    }

    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
        ctx->param->trust = trust;
    return 1;
}

X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
    ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
    if (!ctx) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        return NULL;
    }
    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
    return ctx;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    if (ctx == NULL) {
        return;
    }
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
    int ret = 1;

    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
    ctx->ctx = store;
    ctx->cert = x509;
    ctx->untrusted = chain;

    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);

    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
    if (!ctx->param)
        goto err;

    /*
     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
     */

    if (store)
        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
    else
        ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;

    if (store) {
        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
        ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
    } else
        ctx->cleanup = 0;

    if (ret)
        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));

    if (ret == 0)
        goto err;

    if (store && store->check_issued)
        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
    else
        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;

    if (store && store->get_issuer)
        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
    else
        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;

    if (store && store->verify_cb)
        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
    else
        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;

    if (store && store->verify)
        ctx->verify = store->verify;
    else
        ctx->verify = internal_verify;

    if (store && store->check_revocation)
        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
    else
        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;

    if (store && store->get_crl)
        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
    else
        ctx->get_crl = NULL;

    if (store && store->check_crl)
        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
    else
        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;

    if (store && store->cert_crl)
        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
    else
        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;

    if (store && store->lookup_certs)
        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
    else
        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;

    if (store && store->lookup_crls)
        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
    else
        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;

    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;

    return 1;

 err:
    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
    }

    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    return 0;
}

/*
 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
 */

void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
     * also calls this function. */
    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
    }
    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
        ctx->param = NULL;
    }
    if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
        X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
        ctx->tree = NULL;
    }
    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
        ctx->chain = NULL;
    }
    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
                             time_t t)
{
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                                  int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
}

X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->tree;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->explicit_policy;
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
    if (!param)
        return 0;
    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
}

X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    return ctx->param;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
    if (ctx->param)
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
    ctx->param = param;
}

IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)

IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)